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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Case No. 20150154-CA 
Plaintiff/ Appellee, 
vs. 
Appellant is incarcerated 
SANTIAGO APONTE, 
1. 
2. 
Defendant/ Appellant 
REPLY BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The State's proposed police expediency exception is one where no 
suggestive identification procedure could be construed as unnecessary, such 
that it is more permissive of official misconduct than controlling federal 
precedent. Accordingly, it must be rejected. 
Aponte' s challenge to the State's 404(b) evidence was fully considered by 
the trial court, was preserved below, and is therefore properly raised on 
appeal. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE STATE ASKS THIS COURT TO DEVIATE FROM CONTROLLING 
PRECEDENT AND CREATE A POLICE EXPEDIENCY EXCEPTION TO 
DUE PROCESS. 
The State concedes that an eyewitness's identification of a suspect by photograph @) 
that is "unnecessarily suggestive and conducive to irreparable mistaken identity as to 
deny the accused a fair trial" must be suppressed. Br. Appe. 29 ( quoting State v. 
Mccumber, 622 P.2d 353, 357 (Utah 1985)). Yet the State quickly abandons this @ 
standard and instead adopts the trial court's focus on police expediency, arguing that the 
single photograph of Aponte that was shown to witnesses at the crime scene "was not 
unnecessarily suggestive because it helped [police] establish a perimeter around the gas 
station and apprehend a suspect that was engaged in a reckless, dangerous spree." Brief 
of Appellee (Br. Appe.) at 13. 
Aside from presupposing that the passenger, Rebecca Robertson, was a credible 
witness and that Aponte was actually the driver of the stolen vehicle, under the State's 
(and the trial court's) police expediency theory, no identification procedure could be ~ 
considered unnecessarily suggestive as long as a perpetrator is still at large. Indeed, the 
State does not articulate any suggestive identification procedure that could be construed 
as unnecessary under these circumstances. Accordingly, the State's proposed expediency 
exception that was also embraced by the trial court would obviously swallow the rule 
against impermissibly suggestive identification procedures and give law enforcement a 
green light to suggest any suspect they wish without fear of exclusion. 
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Thus the parties' dispute turns primarily on the scope and meaning of 
"unnecessarily suggestive." Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 196 (1972).1 As noted, under 
the State's broad sweeping expediency exception, there is no such thing. Any suggestive 
identification procedure is not only permissible. It will also be construed as necessary so 
long as any underlying police expediency can be articulated. However, there is no 
precedent that supports the State's position. Aside from creating an exception to the right 
@ to due process that swallows the rule, the State's theory is also not logical, as due process 
prohibits any suggestive procedures that result in an inaccurate or unreliable 
identification and, consequently, an unfair trial. 
The correct legal standard requires a court to consider whether law enforcement's 
identification procedures were suggestive such that they had a corrupting effect on the 
witnesses' abilities to make an accurate identification. Perry v. New Hampshire, _ 
U.S._, 132 S.Ct. 716, 181 L.Ed.2d 694, 80 U.S.L.W. 4073 (2012) (quoting Manson v. 
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 97 S.Ct. 2243, 53 L.Ed.2d 140) ("Where the 'indicators of [a-
'il witness'] ability to make an accurate identification' are 'outweighed by the corrupting 
effect' of law enforcement suggestion, the identification should be suppressed."). Aponte 
has already demonstrated that they did have a corrupting effect. Br. Appte. 10-17. 
Here, police displayed a "fairly large" photograph of only Aponte on a computer 
screen that was left largely unattended at the "chaotic" scene, while occasionally asking 
@ 1 The State criticizes the trial court's due process/reliability analysis and argues at length 
that Utah courts should follow the federal model and not even reach the question of a due 
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witnesses who were milling about and sometimes mingling in groups "if this was the one 
they seen run from the vehicle." R324:9-10, 18-19; R325:12, 16-17, 29; R328:147; 
R328:157, 179, 196. The witnesses were also given to understand that police believed 
the individual in the photograph was the driver of the stolen vehicle. R328:155. Ci 
The State cites Simmons v. United States, 390 U.S. 377 (1968) as support for its 
claim that police expediency justified these suggestive identification procedures. Br. 
Appe. 30-33. In doing so the State does not respond to Aponte's argument in his opening 
brief demonstrating that Simmons actually requires exclusion of the identification 
evidence in this case. See. Br. Appt. 11-13 (distinguishing Simmons on several facts, 
including that in Simmons five witnesses were shown six different photographs that 
included the suspects along with several other people; the witnesses were each alone 
when police showed them the photographs so they would not taint each other's 
recollections; and there was nothing to suggest that police led witnesses to believe that 
any of the individuals portrayed in the photos were involved in the crime). All of these 
factors that save the identification procedure in Simmons do not exist here, as witnesses Ci 
were shown only Aponte's photo, the witnesses were not alone during the identification 
process, and the witnesses were led to believe that the individual shown to them was 
involved in the crime. R324:9-10, 18-19; R325:12, 16-17, 29; R328:147; R328: 155, 
157, 179, 196. 
The State also does not address or discuss the language in Simmons and quoted by 
Aponte that cautions against the dangers inherent in suggestive identification procedures 
4 
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- giving concrete examples of what not to do that are, coincidentally, identical to the 
impennissibly suggestive tactics employed here. Br. Appt. 13 ("Even if the police 
subsequently follow the most correct photographic identification procedures and show [ a 
witness] the pictures of a number of individuals without indicating whom they suspect, 
there is some danger that the witness may make an incorrect identification. This danger 
will be increased if the police display to the witness only the picture of a single individual 
(i who generally resembles the person he saw [ ... ]. The chance of misidentification is also 
heightened if the police indicate to the witness that they have other evidence that one of 
the persons pictured committed the crime. Regardless of how the initial misidentification 
comes about, the witness thereafter is apt to retain in his memory the image of the 
photograph, rather than of the person actually seen, reducing the trustworthiness of 
subsequent lineup or courtroom identification." Simmons, 390 U.S. at 383-84). 
Because it was impennissibly and unnecessarily suggestive, this initial 
identification procedure also tainted the subsequent one that took place ten months later, 
as the witnesses were apt to retain the memory of Aponte' s image shown to them the first 
time when they viewed the photo array. Id. Compounding that initial taint, police told 
the witnesses that the photo array shown to them included the person that police believed 
@ committed the crime. R325:19-20, 29, 37; R328:160-61, 164-65, 181-82. The State's 
brief does not address this fact. 2 Rather, like juries, the State "seems to be swayed the 
@ 2 The State's observation that Aponte's counsel misread the record regarding the timing 
of Warren Smith's internet search for Aponte is correct. 
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most by the confidence of [the eyewitnesses], even though such confidence correlates 
only weakly with accuracy." State v. Clopten, 2009 UT 84,115,223 P.3d 1103. 
Because there is no police expediency exception to the fundamental right to due 
process, which includes a trial that is fair and evidence that is reliable, the State's @ 
arguments should be rejected. Moreover, if the State's position had any merit, rather than 
provide a more stringent and protective legal framework for evaluating Aponte' s claims, 
the Utah's state due process standard would be more pennissive to police misconduct 
rather than less so, and thus not only run counter to Utah appellate courts' claims to the 
contrary, it would violate controlling federal precedent. 
Finally, the State presents an alternative argument that even if the eyewitness 
evidence was the product of impermissible suggestion, the resulting error was harmless 
beyond a reasonable doubt because Rebecca Robertson was a credible witness. The State 
also argues that it is Aponte's burden to establish "a reasonable likelihood of a more 
favorable result had the identification not been admitted." Br. Appe. 45. Regardless of 
who bears the burden on this issue, Aponte demonstrated the harm and prejudice that Gil 
resulted from admission of the tainted eyewitness identifications in his opening brief, as 
well as the record facts undermining Robertson's credibility. See, Br. Appt. 16-17. He 
will not reargue those points here. 
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II. THE STATE ERRS IN CONCLUDING THAT APONTE'S 404(b) 
CHALLENGE IS UNPRESERVED. 
Aponte's trial counsel consistently objected to the State's 404(b) evidence below 
on the ground that it was improper character evidence and was thus more prejudicial than 
@ probative. R187-191; R:327:3, 6-7, 9-10, 12; R329:208 (renewed objection at trial). 
Prior to trial, the trial court considered all of the proposed "non-character" purposes of 
this evidence and expressly concluded that it was not more prejudicial than probative. 
R327:14. 
The State argues that because Aponte's trial counsel did not make specific 
objections to the purported non-character purposes that the trial court admitted the 
evidence to prove, his appellate claims are not preserved. The State also misapprehends 
Aponte's claims and argues that he has abandoned his more-prejudicial-than-probative 
@ claim on appeal. Neither of these statements is true. 
This Court rejected a similar claim in State v. Dominguez, 2003 UT App 158, ,r,r 
18, 19, 72 P.3d 127 (rejecting the State's argument that the defendant "did not properly 
preserve this issue for appeal because he failed to object at trial on the same rule 404(b) 
grounds urged at the pretrial proceeding. . .. Although Defendant's objections could have 
been clearer, they were raised during the pretrial hearing and provided the trial court with 
an opportunity to address the objections. See id. at, 10. Therefore, Defendant was not 
required to object at trial to preserve the issues for appeal because the pretrial hearing 
was held on the record, Defendant timely objected, the judge made a definitive ruling on 
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the motion, and the same judge presided at trial."). 
There is no dispute that the trial court did not have an adequate opportunity to 
consider the purported non-character purposes of this evidence, as the court considered 
those purposes in substantial detail both at the pretrial hearing on the State's motion to 
include this evidence and in the court's ruling. R187-191; R:327:3, 6-7, 9-10, 12; 
R329:208 
CONCLUSION 
Because his right to due process of law was violated by the admission of unreliable 
eyewitness identification that was the product of suggestion, and improperly admitted 
character evidence, Aponte's conviction should be reversed and this case remanded for a 
new trial. 
Submitted this Ifh day of March, 2016. 
JENNIFER K. GOW ANS, P .C. 
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